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The structure of feeling that has been called the absurd suggests a placeless and 
irrational world. Yet such a structure of feeling is sometimes produced in 
response to quite a specific context. This essay considers the way absurdity arises 
and is treated within Anna Seghers’s Transit, a novel about the plight of refugees 
from Nazi Germany trying to leave unoccupied France after the signing of the 
Armistice between France and Germany in June 1940. The essay explores the 
treatment of space and time in the novel and suggests that there is a significant 
distinction between absurdity as resignation and absurdity as dissent. The essay 
also claims that absurdity is explicitly countered in the novel in the pursuit of a 
politics of responsibility and a resistance in solidarity. Key Words: Absurd, 
Walter Benjamin, Georg Lukács, Placelessness, Refugees, Anna Seghers  
PLACELESSNESS, OBJECTIVITY, AND THE ABSURD 
In an essay on two of Doris Lessing’s novels, Seamon (1981, 85) suggests that 
works of imaginative literature may provide “a testing ground” for examining 
phenomenological insights about “at-homeness” as “an essential aspect of human 
existence”. Seamon looks at some characters who are seemingly attached to place 
and others who feel dissevered from the pathways of local social reproduction 
and existential security. In Seamon’s essay two varieties of placelessness (Relph 
1976) are described. The first is that of the spatial dislocation of the foreigner yet 
to learn local ways sufficient to invest locality with the love that may come with 
familiarity. The second is the temporal dislocation of the denizens of modernity, 
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whirling from future shock; placelessness as loss (Arefi 1999). There are, of 
course, many other ways that people become uprooted and we need to 
understand placelessness as a structural feature of many lives. This is registered in 
many literary works about exiles, refugees and homeless people (Greiner 2003; 
Gilmartin 2016; Cooke 2016). In rejecting the apparent naturalism of earlier 
drawing-room pieces (Finch 2015), modernist works such as those of Samuel 
Beckett perhaps stage their own inquiry into the qualities of place and 
placelessness (Travis 2008) and invite us to imagine some of the qualities of 
detachment that Seamon describes. Finch (2016) reviews much of the 
geographical literature on place and placelessness and discusses an anti-place 
strategy whereby some of Beckett’s characters attempt to remove themselves 
from the external world. For some, this gives Beckett’s plays and novels an 
irreality, a merely allegorical hold on the world similar in important respects to 
Kafka (Cohn 1978).  
 This line of criticism, both of Beckett and of Kafka, found early and 
trenchant expression in the works of Georg Lukács. The lack of reference to 
specific places was a symptom of a purely philosophical perspective upon the 
human condition and thus unsuited to the sort of politically-engaged art that 
Lukács called for. This was the basis for a debate about German Expressionism 
in which Walter Benjamin was among those defending modernist artists such as 
Kafka against Lukács (Jameson 1977). Beckett’s rooms may seem detached from 
an everyday world but his characters bring much of that world in with them, 
including its language. Morin (2017, 132) notes that Beckett referred to his period 
of writing after the Second World War as the “siege in the room” and notes that 
état de siège was the term for the state of exception, the police powers, under which 
Vichy France was governed after July 1940. Morin (2017) shows how Beckett 
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successively removed local detail from his stories even while he used much of the 
argot of the Resistance and continued his exploration of the responsibilities to be 
assigned for the death camps he had seen at the close of the Second World War. 
The less seemingly specific he became, the more extensive was the web of guilt 
and complicity. This erasure of place is neither solely philosophical, although it 
has its existential side, nor entirely realistic, although specific referents are evident. 
It may be tactical. 
 There is a certain “structure of feeling” (Williams 1961, 84) in some of 
these responses to trauma, that has attracted the controversial label “absurd”, 
taken from a remark made about Kafka by Eugène Ionesco, and used by Martin 
Esslin (1960, 4) to describe the works of Ionesco, Beckett, and Arthur Adamov: 
“Absurd is that which has no purpose, or goal, or objective.” Esslin describes the 
absurd as showing the world as “an incomprehensible place” (4), “the irrationality 
of the human condition and the illusion of what we thought was its apparent 
logical structure” (5). In asking us to take the absurd seriously, Phelps (2018) 
treats this apprehension of senselessness as a symptom of the alienation produced 
by daily life in the jaws of the contradictions of capitalism. In this paper I want to 
suggest another possibility: that one might express a sense of absurdity when 
faced with an oppression one does not want to dignify as legal or legitimate. Like 
placelessness these may be occasions for a tactical resort to the absurd. 
 In the works to which he gave the label “absurd,” Esslin thought we were 
“confronted with a grotesquely heightened picture of [our] own world: a world 
without faith, meaning, and genuine freedom of will” (6). In the first edition of 
his influential work on the theatre of the absurd, Esslin (1961) used the 
formulation he took from Ionesco’s essay on Kafka to characterize the absurd as 
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a philosophical view of a world “devoid of purpose” (xix) and as expressing 
“Kafka’s own sense of loss of contact with reality” (253). With the second 
edition, Esslin (1969) distinguished this philosophical absurd, that became part of 
theatre in western Europe, from a more explicitly political version of the absurd 
that he claimed for contemporary absurdist drama in eastern Europe, where it 
was “well suited to deal with the realities of life” (272) and able to offer what 
Derksen (2002, 212) has described as a “subversive political critique” of an 
oppressive state.  
 This ambivalence of the absurd was prefigured in early Marxist readings of 
Kafka himself. In an essay on the posthumous collection of stories, The Great 
Wall of China, Walter Benjamin (1931, 496) found Kafka’s work “prophetic”:  
The precisely registered oddities that abound in the life it deals with must 
be regarded by the reader as no more than the little signs, portents, and 
symptoms of the displacements that the writer feels approaching in every 
aspect of life without being able to adjust to the new situation. 
For Benjamin, Kafka described a world where the “consistency of truth has been 
lost” (1938a, 326), and where the “absence of law is the result of a process of 
development” (1931, 498), by which “officials” increasingly behave as “enormous 
parasites” battening upon “the forces of reason and humanity” (1934, 796). This, 
then, is a world that is made absurd rather than the author taking an absurd view 
of an essentially coherent reality. Georg Lukács held a contrary view.  
 Between the world wars, Marxist debates on aesthetics were in large part a 
response to Lukács’s “implacable ideological denunciation” of Expressionism for 
its inadequate grasp of realism (Jameson 1977, 196). In History and Class 
Consciousness, Lukács (1923) drew both on Marx’s theory of alienation and upon 
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his own experience of socialist rebellions and the creation of Soviets in Hungary 
and Germany at the end of the First World War, to develop further the theory of 
proletarian revolution and of the objective conditions that would foster it. 
However, by the 1930s he had lost faith in autonomous socialist revolution in the 
various countries of Europe, and professed to accept the political and ideological 
leadership of the Soviet Comintern. Reaching back beyond the illusions of 
various political radicals and literary modernists, Lukács insisted that socialist 
realism should be built upon the aesthetics of classical realists such as Balzac 
(Feher 1979). As Lukács made clear in his The Historical Novel (1937), even 
romantic realists such as Walter Scott or Goethe, were better than the modernist 
experiments castigated in “Realism in the Balance” (1938, 57), where Joyce was 
dismissed for writing difficult literature, “devoid of reality and life, it foists on to 
its readers a narrow and subjectivist attitude to life.” Socialist realism should be 
readily accessible to a popular readership, and it should explain how everyday 
lives are shaped by relations of class and property. In The Meaning of Contemporary 
Realism, Lukács insisted that realism should provide a “truthful reflection of 
reality” (1957, 22) and proposed that with realism, “place, time and detail are 
rooted firmly in a particular social and historical situation” (78). Placelessness, 
then, is a symptom of absurd, expressionist or transcendental fiction. In an essay 
that asked “Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann?”, Lukács found Kafka wanting on all 
these grounds.  
 In this essay, I take up this question of the political meaning of 
placelessness and the absurd, and trace the strategic uses of these in the work of a 
Jewish-German communist writer, Anna Seghers. She was fully cognizant of 
Lukács’s argument and chose quite deliberately to develop part of her own 
political critique of fascism through the fabulous techniques of Kafka, including 
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the representation of one human context as pretty much absurd. She explicitly 
embraced both sides of Lukács’s either-or, as when she told Christa Wolf, an 
East-German writer of a later generation: “For me a variety of people were 
important. I respect, to different degrees and for quite different reasons: even 
Proust and Kafka–not exclusively, of course–as well as Balzac and Stendahl” 
(Bangerter 1980, 37). Lukács (1957, 76), too, acknowledged the significance of his 
debate with Seghers, commenting on his criticism of the naivety of art that dealt 
only with surface appearances: “I went into this concept in my published 
correspondence with Anna Seghers about realism.” 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL FORMATION OF ANNA SEGHERS 
Anna Seghers was a Jewish-German socialist, abandoned by her compatriots’ 
slide towards fascism. In a series of fictions, she engaged with the savagery of her 
dangerous times, seeking explanations, motivating resistance, and preparing for 
reconstruction. One of these novels, Transit (Seghers 1944a), is particularly 
interesting for reflecting upon themes of placelessness and the absurd. It is 
especially instructive because Seghers was only too well aware of the aesthetic 
arguments of Benjamin and Lukács over realism and the literary value of Kafka’s 
works. 
 Born Netty Reiling in 1900, even her name registered the instability of 
place. Her parents, as assimilated Jewish citizens of the German town of Mainz, 
looked back to the period of French rule that, following a local Jacobin rising in 
1792, had secured the emancipation of the Jewish people of Mainz. Netty was to 
have been called Jeanette, but by the time of her birth Mainz had been under 
Germanic control for 84 years and the local authority would not permit such a 
French-sounding name, allowing only the more Germanic Netti (Fehervary 2001). 
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She was part of Germany’s first generation of female university students, 
graduating in 1924 from the University of Heidelberg with a doctorate on Jews 
and Judaism in the art of Rembrandt. When she had gone up to Heidelberg in 
1920, it was but two years since, in a notable act of antisemitism, the University 
had refused Lukács his habilitation. At the university, “[s]he met student 
revolutionaries and political refugees from Eastern Europe, who introduced her 
to both the idealism and the realities of the class struggle” (Bangerter 1980, 4). 
One group was made up of survivors of the brief Hungarian Commune of 1919, 
in which Lukács himself had served as Commissar of Education. In 1925 she 
married László Radványi, a Hungarian Marxist of Lukács’s circle and together 
they moved to Berlin where Radványi ran the Communist Party’s Marxist 
Workers School, with lectures not only from an eclectic group of socialists such 
as Lukács, Wilhelm Reich, Erwin Piscator, Karl Korsch and John Heartfield, but 
including also, following Netty’s solicitation, Albert Einstein on “what a worker 
must know about the theory of relativity” (Fehervary 2001, 93). In 1928 she 
joined the German Communist Party and soon thereafter the Comintern’s Bund 
proletarisch-revolutionärer Schriftsteller (BPRS), the German Association of 
Proletarian Revolutionary Writers (Janzen 2018). By this stage, she had given up 
academia for a life of creative writing and with her first published story had taken 
a surname from a Jewish artist, Hercules Seghers, a seventeenth-century Dutch 
painter and etcher of visionary landscapes, much admired by Rembrandt 
(Fehervary 2001; Broos 2003).  
 As a communist writer she was living in increasingly precarious 
circumstances. In Germany, the suspension of civil liberties with the Decree of 
the Reich President for the Protection of People and State (28 February 1933) 
was followed immediately by the detention of communists and within weeks by 
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their transfer to improvised concentration camps. Seghers was herself questioned 
but released, her neighbours having hid all her papers, and by May 1933, 
following the book burning at Humboldt University, she was placed on a list of 
proscribed authors. Her husband went into hiding and within weeks Seghers had 
fled to France via Prague and Switzerland, reaching Paris in 1934 (Rosenberg 
1987). There she was an acquaintance and ally of Walter Benjamin, who had 
escaped Germany a little before her. Her mother was among the many who 
stayed behind and, only “a few days” before the arrival of visas secured by Anna 
(Bourke 1998, 157), in March 1942 her mother was removed to the Piaski work 
ghetto in Poland (Grenville 1998, 117), a community that was taken to Majdanek 
camp and murdered in March and April of 1943 (Browning 1994, 136).  
 When, in June 1940, the Nazis moved into France, she crossed into Vichy 
territory anxiously negotiating the transfer of her husband from a camp in the 
Nazi zone to one in Vichy. She settled in Pamiers to be near his camp at Vernet. 
Lobbying for an exit visa for Lázló, she moved to Marseille and it was from there 
that, on 24 March 1941, she finally left fascist Europe on one of the last ships 
before the ports of Vichy France were closed. As a communist, she was welcome 
in few places. The United States was certainly closed to her but Mexico gave 
asylum to her and many other German communists. In exile, in Mexico, she 
wrote Transit, a novel set in Marseille among political refugees. She returned to 
Germany in 1947 but rather than settle back in Mainz she went to Berlin, and 
there, consistent with her communist principles, she joined the socialist 
experiment in the East rather than the US-supported capitalism of the West. 
These multiple displacements shape her anti-fascist fictions not only in their 
setting, which include the Germany of A Price on His Head, The Seventh Cross, and 
Only the Dead Stay Young, the France of Transit, and the Mexico of “The Dead 
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Girls’ outing”, but also in the reflections upon place and displacement that run 
through each.  
 The testimonial art (LaCapra 2001; Bennett 2005) of these darkest of days 
is challenging (Kearns 2014; Philo 2017) and it engages with the themes of 
placelessness, and the supposed meaninglessness of the modern condition. Yet, I 
will argue that at least in this case, the pose of meaningless is a strategic refusal to 
take seriously the legal structures that deny the humanity of Jewish-Germans, and 
contesting placelessness is a way to reclaim from Nazi ideology the organic 
ideology of blood and soil. The structure of feeling described as the absurd is in 
one sense strategically deployed, and in another explicitly rejected.  
SEGHERS’S ANTI-FASCIST FICTIONS 
Seghers’s earliest fiction, “The Dead on the Island of Djal” (Seghers 1924), is set 
in a graveyard where a resurrected clergyman ministers to an underground 
congregation. This could readily be seen, as Fehervary (2001) argues, as a picture 
of Lukács nurturing his group of Hungarian exiles, intellectuals barred as 
communists from formal university positions, and always at risk of arrest as 
insurgents even before the rise of the Nazis in the 1930s, and also concealing 
from the official Communist Party their continuing commitment to spontaneous 
revolution. Her husband took the name Johann Shmidt and Lukács was Hans 
Keller (Fehervary 2001, 92–3). Seghers, herself, in referring to her last year on the 
run in Europe, spoke of being rather like the living dead: “Ich hab das Gefühl, ich 
wär ein Jahr tot gewesen” (“I feel as if I’ve been dead for a year”; LaBahn 1986, 
3). 
 Seghers was attracted by the free-wheeling early writings of Lukács, 
particularly The Theory of the Novel which had a generosity that was later disciplined 
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within narrower ideological limits (Maier-Katkin 2007). Lukács subsequently 
disavowed the seeming universalism and lack of realism he once praised in the 
short-story form that: “expresses the ultimate meaning of all artistic creation as 
mood, […] rendered abstract for that very reason. It sees absurdity in all its 
undisguised and unadorned nakedness […]; meaningless-ness as meaninglessness 
becomes form” (Lukács 1916, 51). Long after Lukács came to see the fairytale, 
the legend, and the myth as insufficiently realistic, Seghers kept faith with them. 
Living in Moscow in the 1930s Lukács perhaps had less latitude than Seghers but 
they engaged in a public exchange of letters on realism. Seghers found Lukács’s 
stress on objectivity constrictive. She insisted that there was an essentially 
subjective moment in the creation of art: “Die Künstler und seine Kunstwerk, 
enzigartige, eigentümliche gesellschaftliche Verknüpfung von subjectivem und 
objektivem Faktor” (“the artist and its unique work of art, a singular social 
relation of subjective and objective factors”; LaBahn 1986, 86). The emphasis on 
objectivity had emptied the world of its enchantment (“die Welt ganz zu 
entzauber”, Kane 1998, 23). It left the artist unable to respond to new realities 
(“die Gestaltung der neue Grunderlebnisse”, Romero 1998, 39).  
 Reversing Lukács’s preference she repeatedly took Dostoyevsky as her 
model over Tolstoy and in 1944, looking ahead to the postwar world, she thought 
the Dostoyeskyan account of inner life rather than Tolstoy’s emphasis on external 
appearances would better allow people to understand the legacy of fascism, “dem 
ideologischen Haftenbleiben des bereits militärisch besiegten Feindes, befasst” 
(“the ideological persistence among a defeated enemy”, LaBahn 1986, 131). In 
fact, her whole approach to fascism was to stress the significance of ideology. In 
an essay of 1941, “Deutschland und Wir” (“Germany and Us”), she insisted that 
communists needed to make allowance for the strength of national sentiment 
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because every people would respond bitterly to any slight upon its national 
character (“Jedes Volk […] reagiert unerbittlich auf jede falsch Einschätzung des 
Nationalen Gefühls”, LaBahn 1986, 102) and when she turned, in an essay of 
1944 on the task of art, to review the responsibilities of artists, she said that their 
obligation was to confront the false notions of fascism in order to liberate youth 
from rigid habits of power-lust  and mechanical obedience (“von totenstarrhafter 
Verkrampftheit in Herrschsucht und mechanischem Geborsam”, 117). 
 Seghers was an explicitly political writer but she claimed more aesthetic 
than political autonomy for her art. With a work such as “Revolt of the fishermen 
of Santa Barbara” (1928), she accepted the injunction of the BPRS that literature 
give workers stories about labour struggle, but her fishermen fail to overthrow 
the power of their employers and the strike leader, while inspirational, is too 
flawed to be an unequivocal socialist hero. She represented society as a panorama 
rather than as exemplified in the sort of typical individual that Lukács asked for 
(Anchor 1980). In this respect, as much as she learned from the social tableau 
presented by Balzac, she was likewise attending to the modernist experiments of 
John Dos Passos. Reviewing her novel Die Rettung (The Rescue), about a group of 
miners rescued after being trapped underground, Benjamin (1938b, 128) noted 
this innovativeness: “The wealth of figures peopling this book does not exemplify 
the general law of the novel, in which episodic figures appear through the 
medium of a main character. That medium—the character’s ‘fate’—is absent.” In 
a beautiful reworking of the base-superstructure metaphor, Benjamin described 
the importance of the subjective factor: “The book treats the political 
circumstances with the utmost caution. They can be compared to a root structure. 
Wherever the author lifts them from the ground, we find adhering to them the 
humus of private relationships—neighborly, erotic, familial” (127). With precious 
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little heroism, Seghers’s is a world shaped by defeat, by the repression of the 
communist revolutions of 1919 and by the victory of fascism in Germany which 
each imposed an obligation to understand the obstacles to socialism. As Benjamin 
remarked: “The narrator dares to look squarely at the defeat suffered by the 
revolution in Germany—a courageous stance which is more necessary than 
widespread” (130). In this respect, Benjamin found common cause with Seghers 
and praised her for avoiding the developmental time of socialist progress in 
favour of the chronicle time of a fallen world that awaits the unlikely, but 
necessary, messianic event of the revolution. Seghers was, in Benjamin’s (1936) 
terms, closer to the storyteller than to the novelist, and thus quite removed from 
the discipline of Lukács.  
 There is great variety in Seghers’s anti-fascist fictions. A Price on His Head is 
in one sense an adventure story. Johann, a socialist on the run after stabbing a 
policeman during a hunger march, seeks anonymous sanctuary in a rural village. 
The Brownshirts are recruiting in the village and Seghers shows the economic 
interests involved but also tries to explicate the complex context of such choices. 
For some, the violence of the movement gives its own fillip to their self-esteem, 
as when Zillich reflects upon pummeling Johann: “The stranger’s blood on his 
hand gave him a feeling of immense relief […]. All his unhappiness had 
disappeared, at least for the present” (Seghers 1939a, 290). There is not only 
psychological complexity in these characters but they also implicitly challenge 
stereotypes. It is widely believed that Georg Lukács was the model for the 
character, Naphta, in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain. This is how Mann 
(1924, 372) introduced Naphta: “He was small and thin, clean-shaven, and of 
such piercing, one might almost say corrosive ugliness as fairly to astonish the 
cousins.  Everything about him was sharp: the hooked nose dominating his face, 
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the narrow, pursed mouth, the thick, bevelled lenses of his glasses in their light 
frame, behind which were a pair of pale-grey eyes.” In A Price on His Head, the 
central Jewish character has the similar name of Naphtel, but although we learn 
that he is old and ill, he is not given many physical characteristics and certainly 
none of the traits of the antisemitic stereotype so readily adopted by Mann. We 
do learn that he is terrified by the Nazi thugs: “The strong and weak attacks of 
their constant Verrecke! Had made his head ache, and his old heart had grown 
tired” (Seghers 1939a, 231). The vulgar imprecations to go away and die leave 
their mark and when he has the chance to claim the reward for turning in Johann, 
he does not: “Why should I of all people help to have him locked up? Who has 
ever helped me? […] Did He meet me half-way? […] Naphtel did not know 
whom he meant by He, whether […] the landlord, […] the state, or God” (260). 
 Her best-known work, The Seventh Cross, is somewhat similar, being another 
story of a man on the run. Seven men escape from a concentration camp, but of 
the crosses erected for the humiliation of the recaptured men, one remains 
unoccupied. Living in Pamiers, Seghers was reading Balzac at this time 
(Rosenberg 1987). She sought a similarly panoramic vision and takes the multiple 
encounters of George Heisler to reveal not only the social structure of Germany 
in 1936 but also the extent to which people had been made into fascist subjects, 
either superficially or to their very depths. Zillich, from A Price on His Head, 
continues his sadistic journey which will later come to The End (1946a) in the very 
place, Piaski, to which Seghers’s mother was sent. In a letter of 1947, Seghers 
explained that in The Seventh Cross, the central character survived, against all odds, 
because he met a few people “who only at the decisive moment, faced with the 
either-or, choose the right path. If we had observed them without George 
Heisler, perhaps only a week earlier, they would have appeared to be hopelessly 
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entangled in fascism” (Rosenberg 1987, 374). Although Seghers was not allowed 
into the United States her book was, and, translated by November 1941, was 
Book of the Month in October 1942, was serialized in newspapers as a comic 
strip, was dramatized as a Hollywood film with Spencer Tracy (dir. F. 
Zinnemann, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1944), and by the end of 1943 had sold 
450,000 copies (Rosenberg 1987). She was looking for the roots of decency that 
might resist fascism and rebuild Germany after its defeat. One of these was a love 
of landscape and in the novel one of the characters who is concerned about 
George, reflects upon his own rootedness: “belonging to that piece of soil[,] to 
those people, and […] above all to the living” (Seghers 1942, 11). 
 Seghers was a chief organizer of the anti-fascist International Writers’ 
Congress in the Defence of Culture (Paris, June 1935) and she gave there a talk 
on love of country. This was also a theme of her essay of 1942 “People and 
writers” where, following Goethe, she spoke of the landscapes of childhood as 
those which made the greatest impression and provided the template against 
which all others would later be measured (LaBahn 1986). Recovering from 
concussion after a hit-and-run in Mexico, Seghers wrote one of her most 
innovative short stories, “The Dead Girls’ Outing”. Delirious, she daydreams 
about her schooldays. She recalls a school trip out to an island in the Rhine under 
the care of her Jewish schoolteacher and in the fellowship of her school friends. 
Through the eyes of her childhood she sees again the landscape of her youth: 
“The more I glanced about me, the more freely I felt I could breathe, and the 
more I felt happiness flood my heart. […] The mere sight of this gently 
undulating countryside was enough to ripen in my veins, instead of melancholy, a 
feeling of joy and delight in living, as wheat ripens in familiar earth and air” 
(Seghers 1944b, 59–60). The story is written in hindsight: several of these children 
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later rejected and humiliated their beloved teacher, and one of them also betrayed 
a close friend at the insistence of her fascist husband. The tone is very much that 
of Nicholas Poussin’s “Et in Arcadia ego”, where the idyll is already sown with 
the seeds of its dissolution. The schoolteacher and one friend later went to the 
death camps. At school she had been taught the love of homeland but, despite 
their childhood experiences of solidarity, they were not told that this friendship 
was an “integral part of that same country” (77). This is the lesson that Seghers 
now wants to impart in fulfilling her teacher’s instruction that she write about the 
school outing. 
 The question of rootedness was also integral to her story “Letters to the 
Promised Land”, in which a son who decides to stay as an assimilated Jewish 
person in Paris writes to his father who has moved as a Zionist to Palestine 
(Seghers 1946b). The condition of those denied residence is also explored. In 
“Travels in the Eleventh Reich”, refugees are trying to find a place to take them 
in when they learn of a land which only accepts those who have no passport or 
papers. In this topsy-turvy land, among other things, the indoctrination of Nazi 
Germany is directly reversed, for the children must find fault with their textbooks 
and will go to the top of the class for correcting the most errors (Seghers 1939b). 
A critical perspective is a vital defence against the feelings of supremacy that she 
finds at the base of fascism. In her retrospective novel on the rise of fascism, The 
Dead Stay Young, one young woman is described as beginning “to feel like an 
individual, a separate identity in the world,” and, in abjuring the pride of grown-
ups and rejecting the claims of the Hitler Youth finds herself thinking about what 
she hears at church: “What if it were true that in the eyes of God […] all men and 
women were equal?” (Seghers 1949, 318). The book has a cyclical structure and, 
while most of the book shows the consequences for the perpetrators of their 
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murder of a socialist during the brief German Socialist Republic of 1918, their 
individual and collective fate is brought together at the end in the murder of the 
son of the original victim and the clear suggestion that history will only too easily 
repeat itself. Towards the end of the book, another woman hears her fascist 
husband and his friends talk of the ugliness of the Jewish women they see walking 
naked to their deaths in a camp, and when she asks about this savage treatment 
she is told by her husband that it is a matter of saving German lives by starving 
Jewish ones. She replies: “There is no such choice and there should not be any” 
(451). And she reflects: “Because the German people were more important than 
everything else, every thing was permitted. But if such things were permitted, they 
could no longer be the most important” (451–2).  
 In her anti-fascist fictions, then, Seghers used a variety of forms, including 
the adventure tale of A Price on His Head and The Seventh Cross, the fantasy of 
“Travels in the Eleventh Reich”, the doomed idyll of “The Dead Girls’ Outing”, 
the epistolary structure of “Letters to the Promised Land”, and the chronicle of 
The Dead Stay Young. Transit is different again. It adopts many of the themes of 
Kafka’s fiction that were later claimed as characteristic of the absurd. However, I 
want to suggest that as part of her anti-fascist work, Seghers is offering this 
structure of feeling neither as a general description of the human condition (the 
philosophical absurd), nor as a straightforward description of life under a severe 
bureaucracy (the political absurd). Furthermore, Seghers explicitly follows Kafka 
and rejects Lukács’s strictures on subjectivity in fiction. I develop this argument 
by first setting out some of the ways that Transit shares the structure of feeling of 
absurdist drama, and I examine the seeming irrationality of bureaucracy, and the 
apparent stasis of repetition and waiting. Then, I set out the ways the narrator 
seems to cultivate an absurd perspective but see this not as imposed by 
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circumstances, but rather as chosen. In sum, this is a framework for dissent rather 
than resignation. Finally, I return explicitly the treatment of time and space in the 
novel identifying the significantly geographical frameworks within which 
oppression and resistance are apprehended. Oppression is conceptualized 
through force and law, and the treatment of these themes in Transit, equals a 
calculation of different actors’ responsibility for the refugee dilemma, an 
accounting that includes both the primary perpetrators and their complicit 
collaborators. Resistance features both in a conception of mythical time and 
space, but also in the ideology and practice of an alternative rootedness. 
AN ABSURD PERSPECTIVE 
Anna Seghers’s (1944a) novel, Transit, is remarkable. The book draws upon 
Seghers’s own experiences in escaping from Vichy France and it was composed in 
German in 1942 during her exile in Mexico. It was first published in French, 
Spanish and English in 1944, and not in German until 1948 (Wagner, Emmerich 
and Radványi 1994, 255). It is set among refugees in Marseille in 1940. These are 
people fleeing the Nazi occupation of Europe. They are held, it would seem, 
within the administrative net, Max Weber’s “iron cage” of bureaucracy (Baehr 
1998), of Vichy France; their days a procession of forms, interviews, and waiting. 
Their lives are replete with paradox. To be in Marseille, the narrator needs a 
residence visa. He can only get this if he shows proof of his plans to leave. After 
unwisely sharing his ambition of residence with his landlady, he is later visited 
again by the police: “I should understand, he said, that French cities aren’t there 
for me to live in, but for me to leave from” (195). Wishing to remain in Marseille, 
the narrator becomes a rather unusual refugee, but all refugees share this 
humiliating contradiction of being unwanted yet retained.  
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 Paul Strobel, a friend of the narrator is himself, a resourceful refugee with 
many contacts in the consulates, but even Paul is ensnared. He is a political 
refugee with an order expelling him from Marseille. He is also a writer. For these 
reasons, some foreign countries are willing to take him. Therefore, he is able to 
raise, from committees of concerned persons, the price of a ticket. Yet, to get to 
the ship he must have permission to enter the harbour area: “But unfortunately 
they won’t give him the harbor office stamp because they don’t give that to 
anyone who’s ever been expelled from Marseille” (248). There was a vindictive 
inventiveness to this bureaucracy. The narrator remarks upon the creativity of 
officials: “I was amazed to see the authorities, in the midst of this chaos, 
inventing ever more intricate drawn-out procedures for sorting, classifying, 
registering, and stamping these people” (31).  
 One person, newly arrived in Marseille, and all set to leave for Brazil along 
with his wife, is picked up in a raid on a boarding house. After his arrest, his wife 
explains: 
My husband just came from the Var. We were going to Brazil tomorrow. 
He came with a safe conduct. He had no residence permit for Marseille. 
After all, why would he need one since we were leaving tomorrow. And 
what if we had applied for a resident permit? We would have been 
crossing the ocean long before we got an answer from them! Now we’ll 
forfeit our tickets, and our visa is going to expire. (54) 
So, the husband is required to return to the Var and request a new exit visa. In 
the meantime, his wife, in turn, is picked up by the police and despatched to a 
women’s camp. The narrator’s indifferent landlady is happy to explain: 
[S]ince her husband was arrested, she was now living in the city without a 
 19 
man’s protection. And all women discovered living in Marseille without 
their own husbands or without adequate identification papers are to be 
interned in the new women’s camp, the Bompard. (65) 
Meanwhile, back in the Var, the husband becomes entrapped by:  
[A] new decree that applied only in his department, namely that all 
foreigners able to bear arms would be forcibly deported. The decree was 
eventually rescinded, but before that happened he had tried to escape, and 
hence his renewed arrest […]. In the meantime, of course, all his papers 
had expired. (103) 
Back in Marseille, and in police custody, he asks for permission to book new 
tickets, so that he could get new visas, and then collect his wife from the Camp. 
At the Travel Bureau in Marseille: 
The Corsican, yawning and poking around in his ear, listened to the man’s 
story: then with another yawn he said it was impossible. Through all this, 
the police officer had been listening attentively. The handcuffs clinked 
again, and he pushed the man back out the door. (103) 
In unoccupied France, this person’s only crime is to be a refugee without the 
proper papers.  
 After a similar disappointment, one individual, given only as the narrator’s 
“bald-headed friend,” (184) speaks with resignation of his efforts to leave and of 
rejections based on seemingly incorrect or incomplete documentation. But the 
unfortunate Jewish man had been demoralised by the unequal struggle, his 
resolution collapses and he decides to return to German-controlled Lithuania. 
The narrator is horrified: “You know, don’t you, what’s waiting for you there” 
(186). The reply contains a parable of despair: 
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And here? What can I expect here? You know the fairy tale about the man 
who died, don’t you? He was waiting in Eternity to find out what the Lord 
had decided to do with him. He waited and waited, for one year, ten years, 
a hundred years. He begged and pleaded for a decision. Finally he couldn’t 
bear the waiting any longer. Then they said to him: “What do you think 
you’re waiting for? You’ve been in Hell for a long time already.” That’s 
what it’s been like for me here, a stupid waiting for nothing. What could 
be more hellish? (186) 
This is a world of fatal suspension, of people facing an “invisible, almost 
mysterious evil of […] rumours, bribery and lies” (32). Refugees shared stories 
and advice. They sought help from people who may know more than they 
themselves knew, or who might help with access to officials or even to boats. In 
the book there is a lot of waiting, hanging around for a possible meeting that 
might bring the whiff of assistance. It is a world where people read the capricious 
refusals of bureaucracy for evidence of a system.  
 The “structure of feeling” (Williams 1961, 84) in this world respectively 
recalls and anticipates some aspects of the works of Frank Kafka and Samuel 
Beckett. The representation in Transit of the contradictions of bureaucracy, the 
repeated frustration of the individual quest to leave, and the seemingly 
interminable and pointless waiting for deliverance might suggest parallels with the 
Theatre of the Absurd, and Waite (2005, 415), at least, reads in this “an 
existentialist undertone of unalterability.” There are certainly traces of the absurd 
dilemma in the book but these resist being generalised as an overview of the 
human condition. 
 Throughout much of the novel, the narrator affects a sort of distance from 
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the common fate of all fellow refugees. For the narrator, the fall of humanity 
registers as the loss of intentionality. The narrator implies that human beings 
deserve to make their own decisions. As he explains to one refugee, people’s 
actions reveal their preferences and testify to their dignity: 
“Unless nothing matters to [them]. Then [they]’ll be like that piece of 
paper over there that looks like a bird.” 
 He looked with great concentration at […] a scrap of white paper 
blowing in a gust of wind. I added, “Or like me.” (93) 
Implicitly, then, for the narrator, a last line of defence against the relentless attack 
on his humanity is to pretend that he has nothing invested in a right that he is not 
allowed to exercise, embracing, instead, the lack of choice as a choice in itself. 
This might separate him from the fate of the other refugees.  
 In conversation with one veteran of the Spanish Civil War, who had been 
with him in a French labour camp, he asserts: “You’re lucky, you’re not like me; 
you have a goal, a purpose. […] Sure, I can arrange [… t]ransit visas, exit visas 
[…]. But what good is all that when it doesn’t matter to me where I go, that 
almost nothing matters to me” (132). The boast is questionable but the narrator 
seems to claim for himself a sort of absurd persona, the choice of a meaningless 
life. He declares himself bored by his entanglements with officialdom: “I waited, 
half amused, half bored. Then they called my name and, half amused, half bored, 
I entered the room of the consular official” (46). He explains that the French 
have a name for the sort of melancholic boredom he suffers, which is really a sort 
of temporary disenchantment with life: 
[E]ven though the sun shone brightly that morning I was overcome by the 
kind of misery that the French call a “cafard.” The French lived so well in 
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their beautiful country; everything went so smoothly for them–all the joys 
of existence–but sometimes even they lose their joy in life and there is 
nothing but boredom, a Godless emptiness: a cafard. (20) 
This affective disengagement is actually a form of individual resistance, somewhat 
in the fashion of Giorgio Agamben’s (1995, 33) discussion of Herman Melville’s 
Bartleby, the character who resists orders with simple aversion: “I would prefer 
not to” (Melville 1853, 25). It is a stance that Seghers may herself have learned 
from her studies of Taoist philosophy, the bravery of non-action (Li 2011). 
 This detachment may be a response to an intolerable world and a different 
world would certainly be preferred. The refugee narrator considers his friend 
George, a French resident of Marseille: “I envied him […] for being so 
uninvolved, for being at home” (157). Each and every day the refugees must 
accept a game of chance, with high risk and loaded die. The future was insecure 
and more than likely brief. Having confidence in any plans was foolish given the 
“confusion of coincidences” (170), yet there is a cruel logic in the game and it is 
revealed by its repetitions. The narrator meets again and again the same people 
and all they can report is yet another frustrated plan. It was a matter of odds: “All 
these casual chance encounters, these senseless, repeated meetings depressed me 
with their stubborn unavoidability” (200). 
 By deliberately disengaging, the narrator refuses to legitimate the system: 
“Whatever seriousness I had before–and it wasn’t much–had almost vanished in 
the face of all the sleight of hand and the countless tricks you had to use in this 
world just to say alive, to retain your freedom” (129–30). Refusing to take 
seriously the formulae that deny your humanity is a privatised form of resistance. 
Swaffar and Wilkinson (1995, 463) have identified something similar in the female 
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characters of many of Seghers’s short stories which “thematiz[e] female options 
for women who explore what to do with their lives given their external 
restrictions.” If in Transit there is an absurdist structure of feeling in the treatment 
of bureaucracy and a world without effective rights, then, we might perhaps see 
this as one form of resistance, a way of withholding assent from, not taking 
seriously, a fundamentally unjust regime administering what Agamben (1995, 10) 
would call “bare life.” 
 Shortly after she had passed into Vichy, and after she had heard of 
Benjamin’s suicide following his failure to cross from France into Spain, she 
wrote to another refugee, Franz Carl Weiskopf, who had recently escaped Europe 
to New York: “I can’t describe our life to you. Dante, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, those 
were bagatelles! […] This is serious” (Fehervary 2001, 167). While she was writing 
Transit, she was reading Kafka (Rosenberg 1987). Kafka was on her mind. She 
had passed through Prague during her escape from Germany. In Paris, one of her 
friends was Ernst Weiss, a friend of Kafka’s and whose first novel had been 
edited by Kafka. Weiss had been in Paris from 1934 and committed suicide in 
June 1940 as the Germans entered the city. Seghers found this out when she went 
to his hotel to look for him, a likely inspiration for the narrator in Transit visiting 
the hotel of Weidel in Paris only to find that he too had killed himself (Bangerter 
1980). At this point, the narrator of the novel, Seidler, takes as an identity the 
papers and exit visa of the writer, Weidel. In one respect, Seghers herself needed 
multiple identities to get her own exit papers for, in November 1940, she “wrote 
to Emil Oprecht, a publisher in Zurich, asking him to confirm for the authorities 
that Anna Seghers was a pseudonym for Netty Radványi” (Bangerter 1980, 97). In 
one of her later stories, “A Travel Encounter”, Seghers staged a conversation 
between three of her favourite writers, Gogol, Hoffmann and Kafka. In having 
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Kafka describe the fate of the central character in his own novel, The Castle, she 
focused upon the very theme of Transit: “Er sehnt sich nach etwas, was die 
Beamten Aufenthaltserlaubnis nennen und wir gewöhnlichen Menschen 
Sesshaftwerden, ein Bleibe” (“He wants a residence permit, permission to join the 
community of ordinary sedentary people, a place to stay”) (Seghers 1973, 181). 
And, again, Kafka is made to describe the central theme of The Castle as 
reconciliation, the right of residence after so much deprivation (206). But, while 
this certainly contributes to the absurd structure of feeling in Transit, the 
cultivated disengagement of the narrator goes beyond this. Her son, Pierre, said 
that the tone of the narrator in Transit was, for Seghers, a deliberately ironic 
distancing from awful experiences: the death of her mother, the suicide of her 
friends, the danger to herself, her husband, and her children: “Das Hauptanliegen 
von Transit was diese ironische Distanzierung von den fürchterlichen Ereignissen’ 
(“The main theme of Transit was this ironic distancing from terrible events”; 
Lyons 1998, 113). I think it is also a refusal to accept the murderousness of the 
regime as having any possible legitimacy. It is presented as meaningless because it 
has no purpose that can be accepted as human; if such things are permitted there 
are no grounds for any choices. 
 There is one further way that the novel refuses the general structure of 
feeling of absurdist drama and that is because it insistently, and for ethical 
reasons, avoids generalizing from these local circumstances to any general 
existential crisis of humanity or modernity.  
THE GEOPOLITICS OF TRANSIT 
Towards the end of the story, the narrator is resigned to meaninglessness at the 
very moment when he seems most keen to elucidate the purpose of life: 
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For the first time […], I thought about everything seriously. The past and 
the future, both equally unknowable, and also this ongoing situation that 
the consulates call “transitory” but that we know in everyday language as 
“the present.” (245) 
But we are never allowed to over-generalise the “we” in this passage. Transit is no 
allegory of a general existential crisis of humanity, for even within the novel we 
are directed to recognise the refugees’ circumstances as exceptional. In terms akin 
to Zymunt Bauman’s (1998) discussion of the distinction between the tourist and 
the vagabond, the narrator in Transit reflects upon the changing times indicated to 
him by an advertisement: “It was a tourist poster and dated back to the days 
when sluggish homebodies were enticed to travel by brightly colored pictures of 
foreign countries” (46). Times have changed, and for those on the move the pull 
of desire has been replaced by the propulsion of fear. The narrator’s fantasy 
makes this clear: 
I could leave if I wanted to. I could do it all. And my departure would also 
be different in that it would not be driven by fear. It would be an honest, 
old-fashioned departure befitting a human being traveling toward that 
distant, fine line. (96) 
“[O]ld-fashioned” travel befits the human condition by being based on choice.  
 In Transit, this new inhumane dispensation of mobility is directly produced 
by the imperialism of National Socialist Germany. Fascism’s oppression, and the 
resistance to it, produce some of the most explicitly geographical themes in the 
novel. This geography of expulsion and refuge has at least four related elements; 
on the side of oppression, force and law, and as resistance, myth and ideology. 
These reflect in different ways the urgency of the current dilemma and suggest 
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complementary readings of the significance of the absurdist undertones of the 
book. 
Force 
The narrator understands the fear of the political refugees, recalling “Heinz who 
had been beaten half to the death by the Nazis in 1935” (13). The narrator 
presents himself as belonging to no political party but as simply appalled by the 
Nazi régime and as one who “wouldn’t put up with their dirty tricks” (15), and 
“out of a stubborn need to take action” (188), he had placed “just one punch in 
the face of some SA boor” (188). For this he had been arrested and sent to a 
concentration camp from which, not wanting to “kick the bucket […] behind 
barbed wire” (15), he had “escaped […] in 1937” (6), and “swam across the 
Rhine” (226). Interned by the French as a German refugee, he is in a labour camp 
near Rouen when news arrives that the Germans have entered France: “Some of 
the men wept, others prayed, several tried to commit suicide, some succeeded. A 
few of us resolved to clear out before the Last Judgment” (5). The movement of 
the Nazis across Europe seemed relentless, reducing the world to “some 
shadowy, moldering, swastika-marked necropolis” (117).  
 Once again, he flees from a camp and, along with so many others who had 
“left behind their real lives, their lost countries” (99), he gravitates towards the 
Mediterranean. On a street in Marseille, he gets his first view of that sea: 
The last few months I’d been wondering where all this was going to end 
up—the trickles, the streams of people from the camps, the dispersed 
soldiers, the army mercenaries, the defilers of all races, the deserters from 
all nations. This, then, was where the detritus was flowing, along this 
channel, this gutter, the Canebière, and via this gutter into the sea, where 
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there would at last be room for all, and peace. (35) 
“Defilers of all races” is, of course, an ironic reference to Nazi persecution of 
Jewish people, and “peace” also seems ironic, for walking towards the sea sounds 
suspiciously like suicide and, indeed, at one point, the narrator, in reflecting upon 
the refugees’ justified fear of the Nazis recalls “a terror so great they were ready 
to walk into the sea” (212). There, at the edge of Europe, the refugees gathered 
with their backs to a continent clawed by Nazi violence, a “ruined and defiled 
land” and, for the narrator at least, the sea stretched as the “consolation [of …] 
inhuman emptiness and solitude, trackless and unspoiled” (36). 
 The movement of the refugees is a rational search for safety: “We made 
what we thought was a very sensible decision. We checked a map to see just 
where we were” (32). The centripetal geography of the refugee movement was 
certainly explicable, for the refugees were “streaming towards the country’s only 
port over which a French flag still waved” (220). But Nazi force reached even 
into here, their “last refuge on this continent” (219). After arrival in Marseille, the 
narrator is advised by one refugee: “The Germans are now the real masters here” 
(39). With the first sight of a swastiska-bedecked car in town, other refugees start 
“acting as if the devil himself had come rattling down the avenue bent on 
corralling his lost flock inside a barbed-wire enclosure” (137). In other words, the 
Nazis were turning France into a camp. 
 The narrator describes how Nazi force reshaped the geography of France: 
You know of course what unoccupied France was like in the fall of 1940. 
The cities’ train stations, their shelters, and even the public squares and 
churches were full of refugees. They came from the north, the occupied 
territory and the “forbidden zone,” from the Départements of Alsace, 
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Lorraine, and the Moselle. (30)  
The specificity of the geography is significant: an unoccupied zone and an 
occupied zone, and within the latter a forbidden zone, the “zone interdit” to which 
displaced persons of all kinds were prevented from returning (Shennan 2000, 49). 
In this respect, the novel also registers the broader political geography of Europe, 
within which France had been subjugated and, by the Armistice of 1940, was 
partly occupied and wholly directed by Germany. By ideological affinity and 
military cooperation, Spain also was an ally of Germany willing to exclude, or to 
return to German control in France, political and other Jewish refugees. It was 
just such a closing of the Spanish border that precipitated the final despair in 
which Walter Benjamin took his own life. The geographical detail in Transit, then, 
recalls the many and specific steps towards mass murder, laying bare the multiple 
forms of complicity and intention so that the distribution of responsibility can 
begin (Postone and Santner 2003).  
Law 
In philosophical terms, one might suggest that the significance of detail is that it 
allows a realist explanation, one that is committed to describing the causal steps, 
or mechanism, whereby things happen (Keat and Urry 1975). By the Armistice of 
June 1940, the French surrender was not unconditional (Shirer 1960). As a 
concession, the French kept a small army, and, although disarmed, their entire 
navy. In return, Hitler avoided the possibility of the French refusing his terms and 
continuing the war from their North African colonies. Giving up their navy was 
not acceptable to the French, but by implication, surrendering all political 
refugees was. The narrator is aghast at “the magnitude of the betrayal” (6). Transit 
understands international relations as precisely about such bargains and 
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abandonment. The narrator observes an international meeting in Marseille and 
describes with disgust the deal being struck: 
Here the Germans had gotten out to negotiate with the lesser masters of 
the world. And once the negotiations were done–at a price set by the 
masters–a few thousand additional people would die behind barbed wire, a 
couple of thousand more people would be lying in the streets of cities 
with shot-up bodies. (212) 
Citizenship is fragile protection given the geographical reach of German force 
and the craven complicity of its formal allies and intimidated neighbours. The 
tempestuous political geography of Europe made citizenship a particularly 
insecure anchoring. By virtue of one of his two assumed identities, Seidler, the 
narrator claims birth in the Saarland in 1914. This area had been incorporated 
into the French Republic in 1792, into the nascent German Empire in 1871, 
retaken from Germany during the First World War and administered by France 
until 1920 when it was made a protectorate of the League of Nations before a 
referendum in 1935 saw it return to Germany. Seidler, we are told, “had 
emigrated from the Saar to Alsace at the time of the Referendum” (33), that is, 
had not sided with the majority of the population of the area in seeking to rejoin 
Germany. This was jumping from one bucking raft to another, for Alsace had an 
equivalent geographical insecurity. It had been taken by France in 1639, had been 
claimed by the German Empire in 1871, returned to France after the First World 
War, and then occupied by the Nazis in 1940, with the intention of re-integrating 
it back into Germany. During the novel, this complicated geography is made 
pertinent at the Mexican Consulate in Marseille where an official looks through 
the narrator’s papers seeking an exit visa from the relevant government. The 
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narrator remarks that “[i]n Europe very few people have the citizenship of the 
country they were born in,” to which the official replies that the narrator is 
“almost French” (90). In this case, the narrator had exit visas from both Saarland 
and Alsace and determining the precise nationality of Seidler should have been 
moot. It is not, because there is an element of evident harassment in the 
bureaucratic insistence on precision, particularly as the pertinent relation between 
place and identity is being translated from a matter of origin (“Where are you 
from?”) to a matter of permission (“For where do you have a visa?”) (Abel 1999, 
162). 
 Another refugee, the “bald-headed friend,” is frustrated by his own 
complicated geography. Born on a large estate with too few denizens to have 
separate jurisdictional status, he gives as his place of origin Pjarnitze, the village 
nearby from which his own area was administered. At his birth, this village was 
part of Russia but after the First World War it was ceded to Poland and hence 
this person has exit papers as a Polish citizen. At the American Consulate, 
forensic cartography now blocked his way: 
[T]he consul was even more precise, the map he had was more exact. It 
turned out that my home village, which I’ve never gone back to, increased 
in population so that now, twenty years later, it’s become a town in the 
country of Lithuania. So my Polish identity papers are of no use to me 
anymore. I need to be recognized by the Lithuanians. And on top of that, 
the Germans have been there for quite a while already. The entire territory 
is under German occupation. So I also now need a new certificate of 
citizenship, and for that I need a birth certificate from a town that no 
longer exists. All this takes time. (185) 
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The detail of this legal geography is important not only because it testifies to the 
turbulent geopolitics of Europe undercutting the easy association of natality with 
citizenship, but, more significantly, because it can be used by interested parties to 
strip people of the protections of citizenship. This use of the evidence of the legal 
geography performs the reduction of politically-qualified life to what Agamben 
(1995, 10) terms “bare life.” It was not the turbulence of Europe, as such, but the 
attention it received from bureaucrats that stripped these people of rights, 
effectively placing them under a “ban” (Agamben 1995, 63), converting Europe 
into a “camp” (Agamben 1995, 95). 
 The official at the American Consulate had not needed to be so diligent in 
the case of the bald-headed friend, poring over large-scale maps of the border 
between Poland and Lithuania. On another occasion, a four-generation family 
applying for entry visas for the United States are rejected because the great-
grandmother has a terminal illness, with “two months to live” (180), and although 
likely to die even before the family reach the United States, the Consul will not 
issue an entry visa for one so sick. The narrator is appalled by these judgments 
and the thought that those who had survived thus far might be refused safe 
passage away from such a place of danger: “[W]hat harm could it do to a giant 
nation if a few of these saved souls, worthy, half-worthy, or unworthy, were to 
join them in their country–how could it possibly harm such a big country?” (178) 
 Seghers thus asserted the complicity of neutral countries like the United 
States in administering a system that stripped the human dignity and the 
protections of citizenship from those fleeing the violence of Nazi Germany. To 
make the point even more emphatically, Seghers constructs a case where 
American dogs have more protection than European refugees. One refugee, told 
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that she needs “statements by two American citizens saying I was completely 
spotless morally,” is in despair. She meets a couple from Boston who, anxious to 
leave on the very first ship out of Marseille, find that the ship will not accept their 
two dogs as passengers. In return for her promising to take the dogs with her to 
the United States on a slower and less luxurious vessel, the couple from Boston 
are very ready to provide the necessary affidavits and, bringing the dogs with her 
to the American Consulate, the woman has no further difficulty in securing all she 
needs to leave. 
 The seeming contradictions and irrationality of bureaucracy, then, had a 
purpose. The appeal to the law was a sort of rationing that denied the vast 
majority of refugees the possibility of leaving from the one free port in 
unoccupied France. It legitimated the system of refusal by claiming a legal basis, 
the papers held by the refugee. The new order of Nazi force denied these people 
a place on earth, consigning them to the bare life of the undocumented, sans 
papiers.  This Nazi ideology produced a particular material geography: “[A]ll this 
discipline, all these commands, all these orders had produced the most terrible 
disorder–bloodshed, mothers screaming, the dissolution of our world order” (9). 
In place of the old world order, there was now one based on distinctions between 
a master race, its serfs, and the expelled. At the heart of this was the Nazis’ claim 
to their territory. 
Myth 
In Transit, the agency of the refugees is limited, but various forms of resistance 
are described. In the form of myth and ideology these include geographies 
counter to those of force and law. I use the term “myth” in Eliade’s (1963) sense 
to draw a contrast between linear time and a more cyclical time that serves almost 
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like a permanent recurrence, an eternal return. This is what Benjamin called the 
time of the chronicle and it is characteristic of Seghers’s storytelling (Maier-
Katkin 2006; Milfull 1998). As has been widely discussed, Benjamin imagined an 
angel poised with trumpet to alert the living to present danger, but being flung 
forward into the future by the force of a destruction that reduces the present time 
to one of rubble. Thinking about how the angel might reflect upon past, present, 
and future gave Benjamin (1940) an allegory for the perspective of his final theses 
on history, composed as he was stalled at the frontier of France with Spain, vainly 
hoping to cross. One of the ways the angel proves a suggestive imaginary vehicle 
is that it invites the perspective of the futur antérieur; the time when we might look 
back on the present as what once had been (Thompson 2015).  
 Something similar is explicit in Transit. Passing a defeated and sobbing 
French soldier, the narrator “patted him on the back, saying, ‘It will all pass’” 
(10). This is close in spirit to the Jewish adage, “this too will pass,” and it gives 
the narrator a moment of calm withdrawal: 
Suddenly I felt quite calm. I thought, I’m sitting here, and the Germans 
are moving past me and occupying France. But France has often been 
occupied–and the occupiers all had to withdraw again. […] I saw the 
masters of the world rise up and come crashing down. I alone had 
immeasurably long to live. (9) 
The presumed immortality of having “immeasurably long to live” allows the 
narrator to imagine the present from a distant future, rather like Benjamin’s angel. 
Contemplating a sort of deep history, akin to Braudel’s (1949, 13) histoire immobile, 
in the sun, sky, old church, and the activities of the local fishermen, the narrator 
finds the “chitchat” of the refugees about visas and their prospects of leaving 
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“disgusting”, but when he shifts perspective, and views the refugees as repeating 
older forms and former ways: “[I]t seemed fascinating now. It was the age-old 
harbor gossip, as ancient as the Old Port itself and even older” (78). That sea was 
the end of Europe: 
[T[he rim of our piece of earth, the edge of our world, which, if you 
wanted to see it that way, extended from the Pacific Ocean, from 
Vladivostock and from China, all the way here. There are reasons why it’s 
called the “Old World.” But here is where it ended. (55) 
The movement towards this place was an ancient geography: 
Ships must always have been anchored here, at this very place, because 
this is where Europe ends and the sea begins. […] I felt ancient, thousands 
of years old. I had experienced all this before. (78) 
 Because the condition of the European refugee was a recurring one, the 
hope of a better Europe had never been extinguished, it was there in the certain 
knowledge that even this current Nazi empire would fall, in the certain knowledge 
that ports of embarkation, like Marseille, always served at least some refugees: 
“For a thousand years it had been a last home for people like us, a last refuge on 
this continent” (219). The diaspora of refugees rested upon the promise of the 
port and the long-lived geography it served. Not even the latest European force 
to have cast out its undesirables could annihilate everything discordant with its 
vision. 
 On the occasion of Seghers’s death in 1983, Hans Mayer wrote of his 
contemporaries’ reluctance to engage with Seghers’s long-term perspective: 
[A] disparaging society of consumers, disinterested in where it came from 
and incapable of believing in any kind of future, can scarcely bear the 
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tragic reality that is found in Anna Seghers’s works. (Fehervary 1998, 132) 
This tragic view is rather like Gramsci’s (1920, 172) “Pessimism of the 
intelligence, optimism of the will” or even Beckett’s (1983, 89) “Fail again. Fail 
better.”  For Seghers, art might preserve elements of hope from the crushed 
progressive dreams of the present: “[T]his is the function and purpose of art as 
Seghers defines it, a kind of ‘post to the promised land’ we never reach” (Milfull 
1998, 74). This is another similarity between Benjamin and Seghers: both 
acknowledge current and past defeats while yet collecting from the rubble 
resources of hope for the future; the modest approach of the chronicle rather 
than the ambition of the epic (Maier-Katkin 2006, 102). The defeat is neither final 
nor complete and there are insights and possibilities worth saving, like the 
memory the narrator has of the two elderly refugees who “behaved like children. 
They had been tossed about with all their bags and packages in an 
uncomprehending world, but it had not managed to separate their wrinkled 
hands” (216). By refocusing from the geography of force to a mythic geography 
of repetition, the narrator withdraws from investing exclusively in the despair of 
the present and, confident of a time of future possibilities, burnishes the talisman 
of hope for those hereafter. Future generations will need inspiration. 
Ideology 
If law was the alibi of those who displaced refugees, then, it might be challenged 
by the ideology and practice of rootedness. Hell (1993) has noted that in the 
1930s Seghers joined with some other left-wing writers, such as Ernst Bloch, in 
insisting that resistance to the Nazis had to include contesting the fascist 
appropriation of terms like “fatherland” as well as the organic metaphors that 
went with them.  
 36 
 People who find a way to cultivate rootedness in the face of chaos seem 
somehow to escape the maelstrom. Or perhaps there are ways of establishing 
roots that leave one less vulnerable. One evening, the narrator contemplates: 
[T]wo tramps […] sleeping unaffected by what was happening in their 
country–feeling as little shame as trees do […]. They had as little thought 
of leaving their homeland as trees might. (74–5). 
“[U]naffected” suggests a form of disengagement, but the reference to trees 
suggests an alternative form of rootedness. Organic metaphors were central to 
Nazi ideology, but Seghers uses them positively to describe a certain opposition 
to fascism.  
 The Jewish “bald-headed friend” who had so astonished the narrator by 
suggesting that, sick and tired of transit, he would rather return home to German-
controlled Lithuania than continue waiting for an exit visa in Marseille, later tells 
the narrator of his interview at the German Commission in Aix. The Germans 
had laughed at him but the Jewish man had insisted: “It’s a matter of Blood and 
Soil. You do understand that, don’t you?” (235). Of course, in terms of their own 
ideology, they would understand it all too well, but in terms of their racial 
stereotypes they would not expect a Jewish person to have any such attachment. 
To “understand” would be to acknowledge their common humanity with the 
Jewish man in front of them. 
 The narrator himself reflects that: “If you bleed to death on familiar soil, 
something of you will continue to grow like the sprouts that come up after 
bushes and trees have been cut down” (251). As the narrator thinks about 
extending his residence permit for Marseille, he becomes “certain that I could 
really grow some roots [… and] might even lose my desire to leave” (66). He also 
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thinks about the permanent residents of the towns, who seem rather like the 
tramps for “the thought of leaving this place was as unlikely to occur to them as 
to a tree or a clump of grass,” and, indeed, “[w]ars, conflagrations, and the fury of 
the powerful [pass] over them” (242). He goes on to reflect upon the comfort 
many give to the passing refugees: “They were father and mother to me, the 
orphan” (243). 
 The narrator shares with Claudine, the immigrant lover of his friend 
George Binnet, the seeming impossibility of returning home: “A leaf blowing in 
the wind would have an easier time finding its old twig again” (136). Yet it is 
Claudine who tells the narrator: “To us, you’re no stranger” (136). The narrator 
had taken an interest in her son, had helped with his medical treatment and had 
bought him books and taken him for walks. It is out of these solidarities that the 
narrator returns to an earlier ambition: “[I]f this cobbled-together life we were 
living was too wretched, then I wanted to be the inventor of another life” (96). 
After the narrator announces that he will no longer be seeking to leave, George 
tells him: “You belong here with us. What happens to us, will happen to you” 
(249). He uses the papers of Seidler to get safe passage to the rural commune 
where George’s uncle, Marcel, has a farm and, accepted into the family, he is 
resolved: 
I intend to share the good and the bad with my new friends here, be it 
sanctuary or persecution. As soon as there’s a resistance movement Marcel 
and I intend to take up arms. (250) 
The narrator has cultivated a rootedness and is accepted into a settled 
“community of fate” (Heimer 1985)—“What happens to us, will happen to you” 
(249). It is precisely this distinction between “us” and “you” that was the great 
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betrayal of 1940 when, with the Armistice, the French surrendered the refugees 
but insisted on retaining the pomp of their navy, however ineffective. For 
Seghers, it would seem, accepting people into a rooted community is very much 
the most effective resistance to the persecution of refugees and this supersedes 
the individual revolt of disengagement. In her own case, Anna Seghers was not 
able to remain within such a rooted community and it was only solidarity of 
another kind, through a socialist kinship with revolutionary Mexico (Michaels 
2012, 19–20), that she escaped the Nazi Behemoth. 
BARE LIFE AND THE ABSURD 
I have suggested that the structure of feeling that is sometimes referred to as the 
absurd is both strategically deployed, but also decisively rejected in Seghers’s 
Transit. Tracing these relations with the absurd raises some important issues about 
how the novel treats time and space, but also about how it develops its own 
ethical and political arguments, for Transit engages explicitly with the trauma of its 
time. In Transit, the urgency of the present is the complicity of so many in 
accepting the Nazi dispensation as something with which to make an 
accommodation. This sets the political task that Benjamin (1940, 257) bequeathed 
to his contemporaries: 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a 
conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall 
clearly realize that is it our task to bring about a real state of emergency, 
and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism. 
Attending to Seghers’s strategic use of a notion of absurdity, and her resistance to 
placelessness in a solidarity of remaining behind, is one way of apprehending 
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what Philo (2017, 36) refers to as “geographies of the senseless”. 
In Transit, something rather like a notion of the absurd is strategically 
deployed in the manner that Robinson (2009) writes of Wittgenstein walking 
away from the language game of politics. There are at least two reasons this might 
be important. The first is so that we could find space to think differently about 
the relations claimed as politics, and the second is that it allows us to register a 
breakdown in trust. In recounting the enervating snare of officialdom, Seghers 
appears to give her characters reason enough to apprehend their lives as little 
more than mess, yet, at least in the case of the narrator, there is something more 
active than resignation, something more like dissent, in his refusing to accept as 
‘serious’ a bureaucratic game so dishonest and cruel. Robinson discusses this 
second walking away from the language game of politics in terms of the realities 
of what Agamben has called “bare life,” and here Robinson draws explicitly, and 
brilliantly, upon Catastrophe, a late work of Beckett (1984), and upon Kafka’s 
(1919) In the Penal Colony, to show the deformation of the language game in the 
absence of trust. This was the “magnitude of the betrayal” (6) when the Armistice 
had surrendered political refugees to Nazi mercy. 
 There is, however, a more radical response to the absurd in Transit. The 
narrator moves from a very individualized dissent to a more collective resistance. 
In part, this involves contesting the Nazi right to the terms of its own ideology. 
This is the recuperation of organic metaphors of rootedness and of blood-and-
soil. This is also what is at stake in the narrator grafting himself onto a local 
community and for them to accept him and promise to share his fate. We might 
question how realistic this scenario was but some Jewish people and other 
refugees were shielded in this way and, for example, the State of Israel has 
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explicitly acknowledged some of these people as the righteous among the nations. 
This bravery brings us to the only ethics adequate to Benjamin’s “real state of 
emergency”: “What happens to us, will happen to you” (249).  
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